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ABATEMENT.
Equity-Revivor of Suit after Death of Part 1-Lintitation of.-
Courts of equity have authority to revive suits on the death of the
original parties independent of the enactments governing revivor in the
law courts: EBxparte Kirtland, 49 or 50 Ala.
The limitation to a revivor in equity is not controlled by R. C. 2542;
which relates to courts of law, but is rather governed by the statutes
prescribing the time in which suits must be brought: 1i.
AGENT.
Sale of Principlars Goods in bulk-Evidence.-The Coes having con-
tracted with Nash to sell his hops on commission in New York, settle-
ment to be made in accordance with the bill rendered by their New
York correspondent, sued for the amount due, and offered in evidence
an account received from their correspondent of a sale of 170 bales of
hops, including 12 marked "Nash." Held, commercial agents have no
right to sell merchandise of their principal as part of a lot with other
merchandise, when the principal has never agreed to be bound by any
sale not made separately: Coes v. Nash, S. C. Micih.
In a suit by commercial agents to recover from their principal the ad-
vances, charges, and expenses on the sale of his merchandise made else-
where, the account of the sale, as rendered by the correspondent of the
agents, if not proved in the ordinary way, can only be received in evi-
dence on the ground of contract, but it must accord, and not conflict,
with the contract. Otherwise it is mere hearsay : Il.
AMENDMENT.
Additional Counts changing Cause qf Action.-A declaration in tres-
pass q. c. f. d. b. a. complained of breaking his close, cutting and taking
oak, ash, beech and chestnut trees ; by leave of the court he filed
another count, complaining of entering another close and taking cord-
wood and railroad sills ; by leave he filed a third, which without alleging
a breach of close, complained of taking with force and arms, &c., oak
logs and hickory logs. Held, that the amendments did not change the
original cause of action: Knapp v. Hartung, 73 Pa.
The cause was called for trial and jury sworn when the amendments
were allowed; on application of defendant the cause was continued at
the costs of plaintiff, defendant pleaded to the counts; when the cause
was again called the court struck off the first additional count and
I From Ilon. Thos. G. Jones, Reporter; to appear in 49 or 50 Alabama Rep.
2 Abstracts by Henry A. Chaney, Esq.; to be reported in fall in 27 or 28 Mich-
igan Rep.
3 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 73 Pennsylvania State Rep.
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"hickory logs" from the other, as being for a different cause of action.
.Held, to be error: Id.
A plaintiff may add a count substantially different from the declara-
tion, if he adheres to the original cause of action : Id.
The rule applies to actions ex delicto as well as actions ex contracti :
Id.
ATTACHMENT. See Insurance.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Confederate Money'.
Defence to-Parol Agreement contrary to tenor of Note.-Defendant
gave to Hever a negotiable note in payment of a patent which defend-
ant alleged was a fraud; plaintiff being about to discount the note, de-
fendant told him not to buy it, that Hevner had promised when the
sale was made that he would not negotiate it; that if plaintiff bought
it he would buy a lawsuit; no notice was given to plaintiff that the sale
was fraudulent. Plaintiff having discounted the note, Held, in a suit
on it, that these facts were no defence, although Hevner had com-
mitted a fraud on defendant in the sale : Heist et al. v. Hart, 73 Pa.
A parol agreement, although made at the time of making negotiable
paper, that the payee will not negotiate it and would renew it, &c., is
inadmissible to vary the effect of the paper : 11.
Acceptance-Form of-By pan/ment of part of Amount.-Peterson
sued on an order drawn upon Hubbard & Co., which, when presented in
court, bore on its face the words, "Paid on this order $40, R. B.
Hubbard & Co." The Circuit Judge declared that this did not consti-
tute an acceptance except as to the $40 paid, and directed judgment to
be entered for defendants. He would seem to have regarded the words
as in some sort a memorandum of payment made, which was error:
Peterson v. Hubbard, S. C. Mich.
Though the Michigan statute requires an acceptance to be in writidg,
it does not prescribe in what form of words it shall be expressed. Any-
thing written by the drawee, indicating an intent to accept, is sufficient.
To say "accepted" or "honored" or "seen," even if no signature is
appended, is sufficient. So is the mere writing of the drawee's name
across the face of the bill, which is a very common mode of accepting
Id.
An endorsement of a partial payment on an order would naturally be
made by the holder, because it would be his acknowledgment that the
payment had been made, and if the endorsement was made by the party
paying, it would be virtually the act of the holder as permitting it: 11.
In a suit on an accepted draft, the defendant may, if he sees fit, waive
all formal proof that the paper was filed with the justice before whom
the case originated ; that the writteni acceptance was made by the
drawees whose signature purports to be attached ; and that the parties
in court as defendants compose the firm which is claimed to have ac-
cepted the draft, and whose signature purports to be attached to the
acceptance: Id.
BROKER. See Contract.
COMMERCIAL AGENT. See Agent.
452.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
CONFEDERATE MONEY.
Pyment of Bill of Exchange in.-F. drew his bill of exchange in
Richmond, Va., during the late.war, on W. & Co., in Mobile, Ala., and
procured JI. to endorse it, in order to enable him (F.) to raise money.
This bill was discounted for F, by the Farmers' Bank at Richmond.
When it fell due it was not paid by F.; L. was then required to pay it
as F.'s endorser. Ile did so through the agency of the Batik of Mobile
by procuring that bank to forward the necessary funds to Richmond
for that purpose. L. had no funds in the Bank of Mobile save Con-
federate treasury notes, and the funds forwarded to Richmond were in
this currency, and the bill was thus paid. Afterwards F. gave his
promissjry note to L., to reimburse him the suui thus paid on said
bill of exchange. L. did not know what kind of funds were paid by
the Richmond Bank for said bill to F. Hteld, that the note given by
F. to L. was not illegal, because its consideration was Confederate
money: Lyon v. Robertson, 49 or 50 Ala.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Pilotage.
CONTRACT. See Confederate MAoney; Trust.
Public Policy-Violation of United States Law-Broker.-A com-
mercial broker cannot recover commissions unless he has taken out a
license under the 71st sect. of the Act of Congress of June 80th 1864:
flolt v. Green, 73 Pa.
An action cannot be maintained in Pennsylvania founded on a viola-
tion of an United States law : ./d.
Although a contract may not be declared by the statute void ; and
a penalty may be imposed for its violation : an action cannot be main-
tained on a contract in violation of a statute. There is no difference
whether the contract is malumprohlibitum or malum in se. The test is
whether the plaintiff requires the illegal transaction to establish his
case. Public policy will not allow courts to aid one grounding his action
on an illegal or criminal act: Id.
Evidence of intent inh-Esto1)pel by Acts or Promises.-Faxton held
two mortgages on the farm of his half-brother Faxon, who died intes-
tate. Faxon's eldest son, Josiah, thought of "going West," but his
uncle, Faxton, persuaded him to stay and take care of the family, prom-
ising that the mortgages should never be enforced. In 1860 Faxton
actually endorsed each mortgage with the word "cancelled," signing his
initials. In 1871 lie erased theendorsements and prosecuted the seen-
rities. Ifeld, that the cancellation of the mortgage amounted to nothing
beyond showing the intention of the mortgagee : Faxton v. Faxon et al.
S. C. Mieh.
If there is an actual agreement between persons, the fact that it con-
templates no positive action during life is of no consequence. Although
a will itself is revocable, an agreement for a sufficient consideration to
provide by a will for any given object, does not differ front any other
contract: Id.
No rule is more necessary to enforce good faith than that which com-
pels a person to relinquish claims which he has induced others to sup-
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pose he would not rely on; not because he obtains any advantage there-
by, but because he has induced others to act so as to be seriously preju-
diced if he is allowed to fitil in the performance of that he has encour-
aged them to expect: Id,.
CORPORATION.
Corporate Power over Members-Consent of Society to being ihcor-
porated-Merqer of unincorIporated Society in Coro,,tion.-31ason
levied upon certain furniture as the property of a corporation known as
Adrian Chapter, No. 10. Defendants insisted that it belonged to an un-
incorporated body known as Adrian Chapter, No. 10, of Royal Arch
Masons, in common with another Masonic organization. Proof being
conclusive that the property belonged to the society and not to the cor-
poration, unless both were identical, the Circuit Court held that there
was no merger of the unincorporated society in the corporation: Mason
v. Fruele et al., S. C. Mich.
No corporation can have any concern in or control over the business
or personal interests of its members, not invested in its own funds or
held under its articles: Id.
The legislature could not compel any person or society to be incor-
porated without its assent. It requires the assent of every member to
bring him in, and not his dissent to keep him out. And when it is
claimed that an association has become incorporated, and has given up
its old conditions, some action must appear whereby such a result has
been fully authorized. Even an absolute identity in the membership
of a society and of a corporation would not merge the society in the
corporation. There is nothing in the statutes which contemplates that
a society can be transferred bodily into an existing corporation, without,
at least, something in the nature of a contract whereby its property can
be passed by operation of law and without agreement, into the corpo-
rate funds: 1d.
Only unanimous consent can bind any member of an unincorporated
company by any action not within the terms of the association, and no
acquiescence by a society or its officers could bind any one who would
not have been bound if the same persons had entered into an agreement
for the same purpose. An act cannot be ratified by those who could
not authorize it: Id.
The burden of proving the merger of an unincorporated gociety in a
corporation is on those who seek to establish it. Nothing could tend to
prove an acquiescence in a corporate merger which did not show a
complete separation of the unincorporated society's action : Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Explanations by Accused.-When a person suspected of, or charged
with a criminal offence, gives a false explanation of any suspicious lact
or circumstances tending to connect him with the offence, it is regarded
as a criminative circumstance proper to be submitted to the jury
Walker v. jState, 49 or 60 Ala.
The refusal of the court in a criminal case to charge at the request
of the defendant, that the evidence must satisfy the jury beyond a rea-
sonable doubt of the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the
offence, is erroneous : Id.
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DAMAGES.
easure ifur )1,ailure to dclicer Goos.-NMo general rule can do
exact justice ill all cases of failure to deliver property on demand to the
party entitled ; but a recovery, which at the time of demand and refusal
would have enabled the party to purchase other property of the like kind
and of equal value at the same place, is, in the absence of special cir-
cumstances, as nearly just as the law can provide for: Chadwick v.
Butlers, S. C. Mich.
It' a plaintiff is entitled to recover at all on a contract for the sale of
goods, he is entitled to the value of the goods at the time when delivery
should have been made. A vendor cannot be supposed to undertake
that the goods he sells shall not depreciate in value before they are
called for : Id.
In a suit on a contract for the sale of goods, it was error to allow the
plaintiffs to give evidence on the theory that they were entitled to re-
cover the highest market value between the time of the purchase and
the time of bringing suit: l.
It was held error to charge a jury upon the assumption that an agree-
ment to deliver at a time agreed upon, on notice given, is the same as an
agreement to deliver at such indefinite time as should be reasonable
under the circumstances : Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Execution; Insurance.
Fraudulent Sale as to Creditors-Retention of l)ossession by Trendor-
Evidence of Fraud.-The retention by a merchant of possession of stock
of goods which lie has sold to his creditor, and his continuing to sell
them as before, is, as a badge of fraud, susceptible of being overcome by
other proof that he was acting as the agent of the vendee and re-
ceived compensation as such : Moug v. Benedict & Co., 49 or 50 Ala.
When a sale is assaulted for fraud, and the date of the transaction is
a material question, evidence that some months after its date the vendor
and another person applied to a lawyer to write a transfer of the goods
from the said vendor to the other person unknown to the lawyer, but
claiming to be the vendee and introduced to him as such, is competent
and relevant, without regard to its sufficiency as tending to prove a
fraudulent antedating : d.
Gift by Debtor- Where fraudulent as against 6reditors.-When a
gift of land by a father to his daughter is assailed for fraud as against
creditors of the donor, and the creditors are all judgment-creditors,
whose debts, as appears by the record, are subsequent to the gift, then
the fraud complained of must be fraud in fact, and the question of fraud
must be left to the jury, and cannot be determined by the court: Hien-
don v. White, 49 or 50 Ala.
A gift of land by a father to his daughter, as an advance to her out
of his estate, when the father is in prosperous circumstances and unem-
barrassed with debt, and the provision thus made for the child, accord-
ing to her state and condition in life, and over and above the gift the
father was left with ample means to pay all the debts for which lie was
liable at the date of the gift, is not void against existing creditors of the
grantor, though his estate should afterwards become insolvent by reason
of the calamities inflicted on the country by the late war : Td.
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DECEIT. See Fraudulent Representations.
DEED.
Acknowledgment of-Attetation by Witnsses.-A writing for tie alien-
ation of land after it is subscribed by the maker thereof should also be
attested by one or two witnesses, or in lieu of such attestation, the con-
veyance should be acknowledged, as required by the Code, to give the
instrument completeness. (Rev. Code, ss. 1534-1536. See also O'Neal
v. Robinson, 44 Ala. 526.) Hendon v. Wldte, 49 or 50 Ala.
When a conveyance for the alienation of land is neither attested by
the proper number of witnesses nor acknowledged in lieu of attestation at
the time it is delivered, then a subsequent acknowledgmnent for the pur-
pose of completing the instrument has the effect of a ratification which
relates back to the date and delivery of the instrument : .ld.
EASEMENT.
Parchase szdject to.-Where a continuous and apparent servitude is
imposed by an owner on one part of his land for the benefit of another,
a purchaser at private or judicial sale takes subject to the servitude
Cannon v. Boyd, 73 Pa.
An owner of land subject to a mortgage laid it out in lots, and built
on two adjoining lots; on one was an alley which was used by the other;
the land was sold in the distinct lots under the mortgage, the use of the
alley beingapparent. Held, that the first lot was sold subject to the use
of the alley, although no reference to it was made in the sheriff's deed:
Id.
Whether the agent who purchased the dominant lot at the sheriff 's
sale expected when he purchased to get the alley-was not evidence to
affect the principal's title : .ld.
EQUITY.
As administered by a Jdge and Jry in Bennsylvana-D-ust ex
malefico.-In a suit at law to administer equity, the judge sits as chan-
cellor, assisted by the jury, who are to determine the credibility of wit-
nesses and conflicting testimony; but the conscience of the chancellor
must be satisfied of the sufficiency of the evidence : Faust v. Baas, 73
Pa.
If the evidence be too vague, uncertain or doubtful to establish the
equity set up, the judge must withdraw it from the jury: Id.
Faust's property was about to be sold by the sheriff: an attorney by
arrangement with Faust and a judgment-creditor agreed to buy it for
Faust; under this it was struck down to the attorney; it was afterwards
agreed that Haas, another judgment-creditor whom the proceeds would
reach, should pay the purchase-money to the sheriff, take the deed and
give Faust a time named to repay him. Under this arrangement the
deed was made to Haas under the direction of the purchaser; Hans
claimed to hold the property. Held, that he was trustee ex malfieio
for Faust: 11.
Where artifice or trick are resorted to to procure property at sheriff's
sale at an under value, the purchaser takes as trustee for the person
misled: Id.
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ESTOPPEL. See Contract.
EVIDENCE. See Agent; Fraudulent Representations.
-'resmilptWons of Ilentify.-X-Name does not prove.-Though the posses-
siom of a note or written contract is some evidence that the person hold-
ing it is the party mentioned therein as payee, the possession of the
record of' a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace does not give
room for a similar presumption, because one man can bring suit on it as
well as another, if he avers his identity with the plaintiff therein: Ben-
nett v. Libheart, S. C. Mich.
It cannot be assumed as a legal presumption that where the family
name and initials are the same the persons are identical : Id.
lVaye.-Identity of name is evidence of identity of persons, stronger
or weaker, according to circumstances: .oug v. 'Benedict, 49 or 50
Ala.
EXECUTION.
Exemption from-Partnership Property.-J. & S. formed a partner-
ship to carry on a mercantile business; as partners theybecame indebted
by note to I. ; on this note they were sued and judgment was rendered in
favor of II. against J. & S.; on this judgment process of garnishment
was issued in favor of II. against B. On B.'s answer J. & S. claimed
the balance of funds in B.'s hands not appropriated by him, as pro-
perty belonging to them severally, which was exempt from the payment
of said debt in judgment. fHeld, that the exemption was properly
allowed, and that the fact that the property was assets of the partnership
did not destroy the right of exemption in the individual partners:
.oward v. Jones & Starkce, 49 or 50 Ala.
The right of exemption is an incident of ownership as long as the
owner, who is an inhabitant of this state, chooses to exert it and the
property is within the control of the court and it is personal property:
Id.
FRAUD. See Debtor and Creditor; Euity.
FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS.
Rescission of Lbontract for-Pleading-Liability for untrue Represen-
tations.-Knapp, on the alleged false and fraudulent representations of
Beebe and Knight, s6ld them a span of horses for a seventy-five dollar
check and a note for $300, made by one Calvert. afterward found to
be irresponsible. Knapp tendered the note and $75 in "legal-tender
greenbacks," and demanded back the horses. Being refused, he de-
clared on two counts, one alleging the fraud, and the other being in tro-
ver for the horses, and lie recovered judgment: Beebe et al. v. Knapp,
S. C. Mich.
The use of the word "fraudulently" in a declaration implies a scien-
ter, and is an argumentative allegation, which, if not objected to, is
cured by the verdict : Id.
Where two persons are interested together in a transaction, the acts
and statements of either in regard to any part of it, even if made in the
other's absence, may be put in evidence; so also, to show quo animo,
may the statements of either to third parties as to'the responsibility of
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the makers of notes which they have endeavored to trade off in such
transactions. See People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119, as to evidence of
combinations to commit fraud: It.
If one recklessly makes a false representation, of the truth or false-
hood of.which he knows nothing, and makes it fbr the fraudulent pur-
pose of inducing another, in reliance upon it, to make a contract, or do
an act to his prejudice, and the other party does so rely and act upon it,
the first party is as liable for the fraud as if lie had known the represen-
tation to be false. This principle applies equally in courts of law and
of equity. Yet, if he honestly believes his representations to be true,
and it turns out that they are ihlse, and the other party suffers by them,
he would not be liable in an action for deceit: 11.
GARNISHMENT. See Insurance.
GIFT.
By Eindorsement -Del'ery1 -Acceptance.-Langdon and his wife gave
Dillon a fifteen-hundred dollar mortgage on which Mrs. Langdon, by
Dillon's direction, endorsed $1000 in payment, his intention seeming to
be to extinguish so much of the debt, in recognition of kindness re-
ceived from the Langdons. One Ferguson, who bought the premises
from the Langdons, tendered interest on the remaining sum, but Dillon's
administrator filed his bill to foreclose for the whole amount, and the
court dismissed the bill : Green, Administrator of Dillon, v. Langdon
et al., S. C. Mich.
In the absence of any rule of law to prevent the donor's intention
from taking effect, the endorsement constituted a gift., or rather an ex-
tinguishment or forgiving of the mortgage-debt. The gift, being in
the nature of a testamentary act for which the donor recognised a con-
sideration in the kindness of the donees, it must be sustained : Id.
Though delivery and acceptance are essential to the validity of a gift
inter vivos, where tangible personal property, admitting of actual de-
livery, is concerned, and probably where the notes or bond of a third
person are the subject of the gift ; yet where the gift is a part of the
sum due, and is made to the debtors themselves, it does not admit of
technical delivery, and the intention of the donor ought not, on that
ground, to be defeated : Id.
The intention of making a gift, being fully executed, and actually ac-
cepted by one of the donees, acceptance by the other may be presumed.
The donor might have retracted it if either a receipt or a release had
been given, since there was no consideration, and the absence of any
might have been shown even in presence of the seal. (Comp. Laws,
§ 5947.) : Id.
HIGHwAY.
Collision-Negligence- Travelling on wrong side of Road.-Miss
Clegg, aged twenty, driving rapidly over a hill, met Daniels coming with a
loaded wagon on the left side of the road. Daniels turned out, but not
in time to avoid a collision that damaged Clegg's horse and buggy, for
which Clegg recovered judgment: Daniels v. Clegg, S. C. Mich.
While it is lawful for one to travel on the left of the middle of the
road when it is not occupied by a person coming in the opposite direc-
tion, still, as the law requires him to turn out seasonably when lie meets a
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team, it would also require him to use more than ordinary care to keep
out of the way and avoid a collision with passing teams while on the
left of the centre of the road, and unless one does use a very high
degree of care to get out of the way and to the right of the centre of
the road, and a collision occurs to the left of the centre and without the
material negligence of the other party, the one driving on the left
would be liable: NT.
The duty of one on a public highway to turn to the right beyond the
centre of the road, would be the same, whether imposed by statute,
custom or common law : Rd.
In using a public highway, one has a right to expect ordinary pru-
dence from others, and to rely on it in determining his own means of
using the road, and even if negligent, he is not liable for the injury
done to the other's property, if the other might, by using ordinary care,
have avoided the collision, and that, too, though still on the left of the
road at the time: .
It lies with the party injured by a collision on the highway to prove
negligence or misconduct on the other's part, and to show ordinary care
and diligence on his own : Id.
If the defendant's negligence is such that injury could not have been
avoided by ordinary care on the plaintiff's part, plaintiff's negligence is
immaterial, and is not contributive within the meaning of the rule pro-
hibiting recovery in cases of contributive negligence : 1.
Age and sex should be considered in deciding the question of negli-
gence ; if the care is such as would ordinarily be taken by a person of
the age and sex of the party concerned, there is no negligence : d.
Driving over a person on the highway is not like the case of a rail-
road engineer with respect to persons approaching the track, and of
whose character or capacity circumstances prevent him from judging.
All persons must notice the approach of trains at crossings, though en-
gineers must act with reference to the incapacity of persons on the track
and seeming to be incompetent, and must govern the train accordingly.
So with street-railway companies with regard to children getting on or
off their cars: 
11.
The " travelled part of the road"-Comp. Laws, § 2002-is that
part which is wrought for travelling, and not simply the wheel-track,
since that may be altogether upon one side: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Separate Estate of Wife-Mortgage by, Husband and Wife of Wife's
Land.-Land conveyed to a husband in his own name, by the guardian
of his wife, in satisfaction of a decree rendered against him in her favor
on the final settlement of his guardianship, will be decreed in Chancery
to be her separate statutory estate on her application : ryi et al. v. Rant-
iter, 49 or 50 Ala.
A promissory note and mortgage of such land to secure its payment.,
efrcuted by her and her husband in consideration of advances of money
to pay off an outstanding mortgage on the premises and to make a crop,
imposed no liability on her or the land in favor of parties who were cog-
nisant of her right: d.
The said mortgagees cannot claim that a trust in the land resulted to
them, in consequence of their advance of the money with which the prior
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
encumbrance was extinguished, and which was made at a time subsequent
to the purchase : Id.
IDENTITY. See Evilence.
INFANT.
Conveyance b-Rescsslon-Delay.-Bill to remove a cloud from
Prout's title to lands which one Cadwell owned originally. In 1850,
Cadwell sold them, while a minor, and after seven years' absence in foreign
parts, said the deed was not good for that reason, and offered a perfect
one, for a money consideration, to Koegel, the then holder, it having
changed hands twice meanwhile. But Koegel held on without paying,
and Cadwell, having served him with notice in ejeetment, let the matter
drop till 1865. Being then in the army, and hearing that the premises
were vacant, he authorized an agent to take possession, and soon after
sold the land to one Haviland, who sold it to Prout. Five months after
the sale to Haviland, Koegel's administrator, under a probate license,
sold Koegel's interest to Wiley. fIebl, that as the privilege of infancy
cannot be used as a weapon of attack or fraud, Cadwell could not in
equity repudiate his deed and regain his property without restoring the
consideration paid in good faith for it. Prout, therefore, in succeeding
to his rights, in asking equity, must do equity, and refund the purchase
price with interest from 1850 : Prout v. Wiley, S. C. Mich.
Delay or acquiescence without any act either indicating an intention
to affirm, or tending to mislead the grantee into a belief of such intention,
or any circumstances of equitable estoppel, such as quietly seeing im-
provements made, or money expended, or a sale of the property to
another, or failure to assert one's claim, &c., will not operate as an
affirmance or confirmation of a deed executed during minority, nor pre-
vent a minor from disaffirming it and reclaiming the lands at any time
within the period allowed by the Statute of Limitations for bringing an
action : Itd.
INSURANCE.
Representations by the Insured hcld as Warranties.-Where an insur-
ance policy expressly makes the application for insurance a part of itself
and a warranty by the assured of the truth of all statements contained in
it as to the value of property insured, &c., and further provides that false
representations, material omissions, and over-valuations in the written
application or otherwise shall render the policy void, all statements con-
tained in such application must be treated as warranties, and under the
general rule, must be strictly true to authorize a recovery upon the
policy: American is. Co. v. Gilbert, S. C. Nich.
Parties may contract on such conditions as they see fit, and if an in-
sured person has chosen to make his representations warranties, as re-
g:nided the condition and value of his property, he is estopped from de-
nying and the insurer relieved from showing that they are material to
the contract, and no court can presume to say that the insurer would
have made the contract on any other terms : Id.
Where it is expressly provided in an insurance policy that over-valu-
ation of his property by the assured shall make his policy void, it is
error for a court to submit the question of over-valuation to the jury as
one of fraud or good faith, because the question for the jury is simply
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whether or not the property has really been over-estimated, whatever
the intent may have been. If the estimate of value has been made by
some one else, even if it be the insurance agent himself, and has been
adopted by the insured under the honest belief that it is correct, the
insured is still responsible for it under the notice contained in the pol-
icy: Id.
Claim for loss on Policy--Liabilty to Garnishment.-IIcbel insured
in the company May 27th 1872. Martz and his co-plaintiffs sued him
in assumpsit, Dec. 18th 187 2, and obtained judgment, at the same time,
the premises having burned, garnishing the company, which, Jan. 29th
1873, disclosed the fact of insurance, but denied that proof of loss by fire
had been furnished them. The insurance policy had stipulated that it
should be optional with the company to replace the articles lost or dam-
aged, or to take them at their appraised value, or to rebuild or repair
within a reasonable time, if they gave notice of such an intention within
thirty days after receiving the preliminary proofs. On April 29th 1873,
Rebel made the proofs of loss, and gave the required notice, and on
July 15th, there was a final hearing in garnishment, pursuant to Comp.
Laws, § 6467, when it was shown that the company had not undertaken
to restore, rebuild, or repair, and did not mean to do so. The court ad-
judged the company not liable: Xartz et al. v. Detroit F. & .. Insur-
ance Co., Garnishee of Ilebel, S. C. Mich.
An insurance company being garnished, it was held that the right to
hold it upon the process in garnishment depended upon the state of the
claim as one garnishable or not at the time of service of process : Id.
Under Comp. Laws, § 6503, which enacts that no one shall be ad-
judged a garnishee by reason of any money or other thing due from him
to the principal defendant, unless it be at the time of service of the writ
of garnishment, due, or to become due, absolutely, and without depend-
ing on any contingency, it was held that the liability of an insurance
company was contingent, the policy reserving to them the privilege of
choosing between making indennity by replacing the property, or by
paying fbr it. The right to elect between these courses was absolute
and exclusive as conferred by the policy, and could not be extinguished
by the insured, and reduced to a determinate character : Id.
NA5 . See Evidence.
NATURALIZATION.
Certificate is a Record not impeachable collaterally.-Certificates of
naturalization granted by the courts, on which Congress has conferred
jurisdiction, stand on the footing of judgments of courts of competent
jurisdiction, and when drawn in question collaterally, are conclusive,
unless invalidity is apparent on their face: Scott v. Strobach, 49 or 50
Ala.
A certificate of naturalization, except in a direct proceeding for its
revocation in the court granting it, is unimpeachable. No allegations




Rights of Representatires of a Deceased Partner.-The representatives
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
of a deceased partner have no right of possessiion, and nothing but an
equitable interest in the partnership property, until the business of the
partnership has been settled and its debts paid ; and though this equi-
table interest may make them tenants in common with the surviving
partner, subject to the debts of the firm and a final settlement, it does
not constitute them tenants in common at law : .Z'fefer v. Steiner, S. C.
Mich.
Suit by a Survivor.-The right of action at law for any trespass on
the property of a firm, a member of which has died, rests solely in the
survivor: Id.
I PILOTAGE.
State Laws-Constitutional Law.-The Act of March 24th 1851,
provides that a vessel licensed to coast not taking a pilot shall pay half
pilotage and one not licensed full pilotage :-" and all half pilotage,
forfeitures and penalties in nature thereof, accruing by virtue of this
act * * * shall be recovered in the name and for the use of the society,"
for relief of pilots, &e. Held, that a forfeiture of full pilotage was for
the use of the society : Collins v. Soc. for Relief of Distressed Pilots, &c.,
73 Pa.
The appropriation of the penalty is not part of the penal provision and
is to be construed reasonably to ascertain the intent of the legislature:
Id.
The penalty not being a tax, its appropriation to a private corporation
is not unconstitutional: Id.
Imposing full pilotage on vessels in foreign commerce and half pilot-
age on coasting vessels, is not in conflict with sect. 10 of art. 1 of United
States Constitution : l.




Completion of-Identity of Goods-Acts renmaining to be done by Vn-
dor.-If goods are unmistakably designated, even without express words,
neither delivery, deliverable condition, nor certainty as to quantity and
quality, is absolutely essential to the completeness of the sale : Lingiam
& Osborne v. Eggleston, S. C. Mich.
The question whether a sale is completed or only executory must be
determined from the construction of the agreement, showing the intent
of the parties, the situation of the thing sold, and the circumstances:
Id.
Delivery is almost conclusive evidence that the property shall vest'in
the purchaser, notwithstanding that weighing, measuring, inspection,
&c., is to be done afterwards: Id.
Property may pass under a contract even when something remains to
be done by the vendor, although it be only at the direction and for the
convenience of the vendee : Id.
Where the price depends on the quantity or quality of goods, whatever
remains to be done by the vendor, or for the mutual convenience of both
parties, as weighing, testing or measuring, is a condition precedent to
the transference of title : Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
SHERIFF'S SALE. See Equity.
STOLEN PROPERTY. See Trover.
TROVER.
Ratification of Sale.-In an action of trover against one who received
for sale a wagon belonging to the plaintiff, from his pretended guardian,
and sold it, receiving the purchase-money for which he gave his prom-
issory note payable to the said guardian, the fact that the plaintiff, with
knowledge of the circumstances, received the note from the payee, and
demanded the payment of the maker which was refused, is not so con-
elusive of an intention to ratify the sale as to preclude him from main-
tainiug the suit: Abbott v. May, 49 or 50 Ala.
Owner of Stolen Property may reclaim.-The owner of negotiable se-
curities which have been stolen may follow them and reclaim them in
whose hands soever they may be found, and when shown that the secu-
rities had been stolen from the owner, the burden is upon the holder to
show that he took them in the usual course of business and for value
Robinson v. 1odgson, 73 Pa.
In trover fbr such securities, merely showing that they were in pos-
session of another from whom defendant or his immediate bailor received
them is not a defence : Id.
A holder's possession isprima firie evidence of ownership, because
the presumption is that it was honestly acquired: Id.
VRaUsT. See Equity.
Discretion of Trustee-Control of Court of Equity over-Tram-
melling of his discretion by promise to exercise it in particular way.-
A testator devised his whole estate (after some legacies) to his executor,
in trust to select and purchase a lot in Philadelphia, thereon to erect a
building for the Philadelphia Library Company; and as soon as the
building should be completed to convey the lot to the company; he
afterwards purchased a lot himself; a few days before his death he di-
rected that the building should be erected on that lot; and at his request
the executor verbally promised the testator that he would erect the
building there; after the testator's death he selected it. He answered
to a bill to declare him disqualified to act as a trustee by reason of having
trammelled his discretion by his promise, that he had selected the lot
not only in accordance with the testator's wishes but with his own judg-
ment, after a careful deliberation. 1ield, that his discretion was not so
controlled as to disqualify him : Williams's Appeal, 73 Pa.
Such trust could not be taken from the donee except on the clearest
evidence of his incapacity, or that he was acting in fraud of his powers:
Id.
The verbal direction of the testator and promise of the executor, were
not a fraud on the power in the will, and the trustee was bound to per-
form the promise: L.
A chancellor will so control a trustee that he shall not disappoint the
intent of the donor, as gathered from the instrument containing the
power: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
An innocent motive will not save the exercise of the power if it
violate the'true purpose of the trust: Id.
When a testator, to fulfil his own purpose, confers an absolute discre-
tion, it is his right to have the power executed by his own trustee, and a
court cannot displace the trustee without clear and adequate cause: 7d.
Purchase by Trustee- Consideration for Contract to stand Trustee.-
A testator devised lands in trust for a charity; and made a residuary
devise. The residuary devisees and heirs at law commenced proceed-
ings to have the devise declared void, and agreed as a flmily arrange-
ment, to avoid dispute amongst themselves, that in case of success it
should be treated as intestate property. The court below decided the
devise good; an appeal was taken under the same agreement; the hus-
band of one of the heirs having means (the others being poor), agreed
to pay the expenses, &c., to be taken out of the land and the balance
to be divided between his wife and the other heirs. Held, that these
facts constituted a sufficient consideration for his agreement: Dickey's
Appeal, 73 Pa. -
This agreement constituted the wife a tenant in common in equity
with the other heirs in the title if any, to the lands; and the husband
was bound to proceed with the appeal until released by all the parties : Rd.
Any purchase of the lands made by the husband on behalf of his
wife would enure to the benefit of the other heirs : Id.
The appeal pending, the husband purchased the lands from the trus-
tees in the devise and sold them at an advance. Held, that he was
trustee for the heirs and must account for the profits: Id.
The husband sold the lands and some of his own adjoining of greater
value for an aggregate sum. Held, that he was entitled to be credited in
his account with the excess of value of his own lands : Id.
Power- To sell includes power to mortgage-Security.-Husband and
wife conveyed land in trust, amongst other things empowering the
trustee to sell such parts as the wife by writing might request, and pay
the purchase-money to the wife. The trustee had power on request in
writing of the wife to mortgage the land: Zane v. Kennedy 73 Pa.
At the request of the wife, the trustee sold the property to A., in
order that he might mortgage it as collateral security for money to set
up her son in business. Held to be a valid execution of the power in
the trust-deed: Id.
An absolute and unrestricted power to sell includes a power to amort-
gage : Id.
The mortgage was given to secure the payipent of notes of the son
their times of payment were extended by the holders. There being no
evidence of. a consideration for such extension, Held, that this did not
discharge the wife if she were surety: Id.
The trust provided first for the payment of debts of the husband ; the
land having been sold under the mortgage ; in ejectment against the
purchaser by the wife as cestui que trust to recover her equitable estate,
she could not set up these debts; that could be done only by the
husband's creditors or the trustee for their use : Id.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Debtor and Creditor; Fraudulent
Representations; Sale. '
